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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR., et ux,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DAVID M. HORNE, et ux,
No. 14513
Defendants-Respondents,
v.
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
et al,
Third-Party Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter referred to as
"Appellants" or "Gassers") brought an action in the Third
Judicial District Court to enjoin the delivery and recordation
of a deed placed in escrow and to declare unenforceable an
agreement they had entered into with Defendants-Respondents
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondents" or "Homes").
Respondents counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint
against American Savings & Loan Association and others,
claiming an interest in certain real property resulting from
the agreement between Appellants and Respondents.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin of the Third Judicial

Court of Salt Lake County rendered judgment for Respondents
and against Appellants refusing to set aside the agreement
between the parties and adjudging Respondents to be the owners
of an undivided 50% fee interest in certain real estate,
subject, however, to a trust deed given to American Savings &
Loan to secure a certain promissory note, on which note and
obligation the court further determined Respondents were
personally liable.
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on January 5,
1976, which appeal was dismissed by this Court on February 2,
1976.

Although no further notice of appeal was thereafter

filed, on motion of Appellants the lower court on March 1,
1976, granted Appellants an extension of time to file their
notice of appeal.

How Appellants are able to revive an appeal

which has once been dismissed by this Court is a matter which
this Court will have to reconcile.

But since Respondents do

not believe the appeal itself has substance, they have chosen
to address their brief to the merits.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
In the event this Court chooses to review the case on
the merits, Respondents seek affirmance of the decision and
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents take issue with Appellants' Statement of
Facts as being incomplete.

Appellants state only those facts

favorable to their contentions to the exclusion of evidence
2

supporting the findings of the trial court.

They further fail

to support many of their statements with any specific reference
to the record•

Respondents, therefore, feel obliged to submit

the Statement of Facts as follows:
During 1971 and 1972 Appellant Joseph S. Gasser, Jr.
became involved in several business transactions with a group
of businessmen and doctors, headed by Messrs. Skankey, Doty,
Strausser and Sorbonne.

Appellants Gasser acquired a 42.5%

interest in the Hill Gate Terrace Mobile Home Community,
Layton, Utah.

Dr. Skankey also acquired a 42.5% interest in

the same trailer park.

(Tr. 35-38, 97-101)

As a result of

this acquisition by Appellants and other transactions between
these parties, Gassers became indebted to Skankey individually
in the sum of approximately $139,000.00, evidenced by a
promissory note.

(Tr. 100-105)

This note was secured by a

second mortgage on Gassers1 interest in the Hill Gate Trailer
Park.

(Tr. 105)

Messrs. Skankey, Doty, Strausser and

Sorbonne (referred to by the trial court as "the group") also
held a note from Gasser for $225,000.00.

This note was

secured by a mortgage of Gassersf interest in the trailer park
and also by a mortgage on certain Montana properties.
101-104; Exh. 12-D)

(Tr.

In August of 1972, Gasser proposed

refinancing the trailer park in order to pay these notes and
offered to purchase Dr. Skankey1s 42.5% interest for
$200,000.00.

(Tr. 107, 110, 114; Exhs. 13-D and 15-D)

Skankey agreed to sell his interest for $275,000.00.
3

Dr.
(Tr.

42; Exh. 18-D)
When Gassers1 obligations became delinquent in November,
1972, Mr. Joseph L. Henriod was retained by Skankey and "the
group" to collect the same; and Gasser was given notice to
pay.

(Tr. 38-40, 350)

Continuing pressure was thereafter

exerted on Gasser by Mr. Henriod to pay the amounts owing.
(Tr. 113, 330)

Gasser came to Mr. Henriod on several occasions

and discussed with him different methods or alternatives by
which Gasser might meet his obligations to Dr. Skankey and
"the group."

(Tr. 40-42, 113-114, 288, 299; Exh. 15-D)

At

this time Appellants were represented by Attorney James Barker
who continued to act as legal counsel for them through July,
1973.

(Tr. 103, 118, 144-145, 288, 293-295)
In the early part of January, 1973, Gasser approached

H o m e and asked H o m e to help him obtain the necessary
financing to pay off the obligations and purchase the remaining 57.5% interest in the trailer park.

(Tr. 56, 114)

After

viewing the property, H o m e agreed to lend assistance but
stated that if he were required to sign for a loan he would
need to receive compensation therefor.

(Tr. 57-61, 357)

H o m e and Gasser then submitted a joint loan application to
American Savings & Loan Association for over $1,050,000.00,
which money was to be used to pay off the obligations owing
by Gasser individually and to acquire the other 57.5% interest
in the trailer park which was owned by Skankey and two others.
(Tr. 111-112; Exh. 3-P)
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Late in March, 1973, Gasser called Mr. Henriod and
reported that he (Gasser) was going to receive the necessary
outside financial assistance from H o m e and that they were
going to get a loan from American Savings.

(Tr. 290)

Prior

to that time Mr. Henriod was not involved in and had no
knowledge of Gasserrs contacts with H o m e .

(Tr. 113, 290-291)

Although Mr. Henriod had represented H o m e on other matters,
he did not undertake to represent H o m e at any time in this
transaction.

(Tr. 115, 290, 319, 326, 344, 350)

As the

representative for Dr. Skankey and "the group," Mr. Henriod
discussed with Gasser and H o m e their financing agreements;
but only at Gasser1s requests.
344)

(Tr. 113, 115, 309, 326, 335,

He was never asked to represent H o m e (Tr. 290, 368)

and was never paid by H o m e .

(Tr. 312, 36 8)

Gasser brought H o m e into Mr. Henriod1 s office on March
29, 1973, to discuss the refinancing with American Savings
in particular.

(Tr. 290-293)

After coming to an agreement

with H o m e in private conversation and out of the presence
of Henriod, Gasser then dictated to Mr. Henriod what he and
H o m e had tentatively agreed verbally to do; that is, if H o m e
would sign on the loan from American Savings, he (Gasser)
would give H o m e a 50% interest in the trailer park, subject
to the new loan of over a million dollars; provided that if
Gasser were able to refinance the loan within 60 days without
Home's signature, H o m e would not receive any compensation.
(Tr. 115, 117, 292, 314)

This agreement, Exhibit 4-P, was
5

typed and sent unsigned to Mr. Barker for his approval as
attorney for the Gassers.

(Tr. 118, 292)

H o m e did not

discuss the matter further with either Gasser or Mr. Henriod
until late June, 1973.

(Tr. 116, 139, 296-297, 322)

Mr. Henriod continued to press Gasser to pay Skankey and
"the group" the overdue obligations.

(Tr. 120, 330)

Because

Gasser still procrastinated, proceedings were begun in Montana
to foreclose the Montana mortgage to "the group."

(Tr. 289)

On June 11, written notice was given by Henriod to Gasser
that unless the debts were satisfied by June 25, 1973,
proceedings would be instituted to foreclose the Hill Gate
mortgage.

(Tr. 121, 297? Exh. 16-D)

For more than 60 days following the meeting in Henriod's
office and particularly during April, May and early June,
Gasser made further efforts to obtain financing without Home's
signature.

(Tr. 116, 118, 248)

He finally informed Mr.

Henriod that he (Gasser) would be ready to close on June 25
and was obtaining the necessary financing without H o m e .
134-136, 296-298, 300)

(Tr.

On June 22, the final closing agreement

(Exh. 18-D) between Gasser and Skankey and "the group" was
prepared; and in accordance with Gasserfs instructions to Mr.
Henriod, Henriod deleted Home's name from the transaction.
(Tr. 134-136, 298-299; Exh. 18-D, 1[4) Then, on June 25,
without prior warning or notice, Gasser called Mr. Henriod
inquiring whether H o m e was ready to sign their agreement,
Exhibit 4-P.

(Tr. 136, 300)

Since Mr. Henriod had not
6

discussed the agreement with Horne subsequent to the March 29
meeting, he replied that he didn't know but would inquire.
(Tr. 301)

When reached in San Francisco, Horne simply stated

that he didn't know but would discuss it upon his return.
(Tr. 301, 359)
On June 27, 1973, Horne and Gasser again met in Mr.
Henriod1s office.

Horne declined to sign the agreement,

claiming that the time provided in Exhibit 4-P had already
expired.
and left.

(Tr. 301, 360)

At that point Gasser became upset

(Tr. 84, 300)

The next morning, June 28, Gasser

called Mr. Henriod and told him that he and Horne had talked
and resolved their differences.

(Tr. 140-141, 302, 329, 364)

He asked Mr. Henriod to prepare a new agreement (Exhs. 5-P
and 22-D) and dictated the following terms: that upon the
extension of his credit, Horne would receive a 50% interest
in the trailer park if Gasser could not sell the loan to
Equitable Savings of Portland within 30 days.
302, 364-365; Exhs. 5-P and 22-D)

(Tr. 140-141,

Gasser assured Horne there

would be no trouble in selling the loan to Equitable Savings
within 30 days.

(Tr. 364)

Agreement 5-P was immediately prepared and taken to
Home's office by Mr. Henriod where he again met with both
the Gassers and Homes.

(Tr. 302-303, 354-355)

After

interlineating a change, this agreement was signed by the
Homes and by Mr. Gasser.

(Tr. 303-305)

The Homes also

executed a note and trust deed to American Savings for
7

$1,050,000.00.

(Tr. 354)

However, Appellant Freda Gasser

refused to sign the agreement, stating that she wanted to
first consult with their attorney, Mr. Barker.

(Tr. 183, 305)

The Gassers took both copies of the agreement (Exhs. 5-P and
22-D) and that afternoon consulted with Mr. Barker.

(Tr.

144, 183-184, 305)
Mr. Barker called Mr. Henriod the next morning, June 29,
and indicated that he wanted a change in paragraph 4 of the
agreement.

(Tr. 145, 184, 307)

He instructed Mr. Henriod to

prepare the agreement with that change but stated he had
advised Gassers not to execute the agreement.
307, 344)

(Tr. 225-226,

The final agreement, Exhibit 6-P, was then prepared

and the Homes' signatures were then obtained by messenger.
(Tr. 308, 330, 338-339)
That afternoon, June 29, Mr. Henriod delivered to the
escrow agent's office the final agreement (Exh. 6-P), the
note and the trust deed, all of which had been executed by
the Homes.

(Tr. 308)

Agreement 6-P was then executed by

both Mr. and Mrs. Gasser in the presence of Mr. Henriod and
the escrow agent, Mr. Ralph J. Marsh.

(Tr. 211-212, 308)

Because of the lateness of the hour, a disbursal of funds was
delayed until Monday, July 2.

On Monday, disbursement of the

proceeds of the loan was made by the escrow agent Marsh
pursuant to instructions from the parties, including American
Savings & Loan.

(Tr. 204-205, 213-215, 249; Exh. 7-P)

Mr.

Henriod received the appropriate funds on behalf of his client,
8

Dr. Skankey.

(Tr. 156, 309, 310)

After other necessary

disbursements, $94,000.00 was disbursed to Gasser for his
personal use.

(Tr. 149, 151; Exh. 19-D)

The obligation owed

"the group" was not paid at that time but was discharged at
a later date with proceeds from the sale of the Montana
properties.

(Tr. 154-156, 208; Exh. 18-D)

On July 3, 1973, Equitable Savings gave notice to
American Savings and Appellants that it elected not to
participate in the loan transaction.

(Exh. 10-P)

During the

remainder of July, Appellants did nothing to arrange any other
participation or sale of the loan nor did they attempt to
contact either Respondents or Mr. Henriod to so inform them
or to ask for any extension of time.

(Tr. 148, 151, 311, 367)

At the end of the 30-day period Appellants brought this suit
to prevent recordation of the trust deed and note which
Respondents had cosigned with Gassers and also to prevent the
recordation or delivery of the deed from Gassers to Homes of
a 50% interest in the property.

(R. 1-2)

As a result, the

note and trust deed executed by Respondents and the deed to
Respondents from Appellants were retained by the escrow agent,
subject to final adjudication of the litigation.
355-356)

(Tr. 214,

In January, 1974, while the litigation has been

pending, American Savings & Loan has assigned a 75% interest
in the note and trust deed executed by Appellants to Far West
Federal Savings, Portland, Oregon, but has continued to
service the loan.

(Tr. 6, 250-252; Exh. 1-P)
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POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
It is apparent that the object of Appellants' brief is
to reargue the weight of the evidence in an effort to get
this Court to grant a retrial of the issues. Appellants ask
this Court to review the evidence, resolve the issues in their
favor where there is a conflict in the evidence and draw
inferences from the facts different from those drawn by the
trial court.

In so doing, Appellants completely ignore the

basic rule of law that findings of fact of the court below
will not be disturbed on appeal because an appellant views
the facts differently.

Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah,

1975); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972);
Nelson v. Nelson, 30 U.2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011 (1973); Corbet v.
Corbet, 24 U.2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).

On appeal this

Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
findings of the trial court.

Cook v. Gardner, 14 U.2d 193,

381 P.2d 78 (1963).
The trial court is in an advantaged position in factual
matters.

Pagano v. Walker, supra; Peterson v. Holloway, 8

U.2d 328, 334 P.2d 559 (1959); Child v. Child, 8 U.2d 261,
332 P.2d 981 (1958); Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 U.2d 396, 268
P. 2d 425 (1954).

It is that court's responsibility and

advantage to hear the testimony of the witnesses, observe
their demeanor and conduct in testifying and give to such
10

testimony the weight to which the trier of the fact deems it
is entitled.
Likewise, in equity cases this Court, when reviewing the
evidence to determine if it supports the findings, takes into
account the advantaged position of the trial judge.
Stone, 19 U.2d 378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967).

Stone v.

So long as there is

evidence to support a factual determination, this Court will
not reverse that determination even though this Court may
disagree as to the determination.

Brigham v. Moon Lake

Electric Assn., 24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970).
The principles of equity state that findings "will not
be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
them and a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought.11
McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 U.2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974).
Factual issues which Appellants ask this Court to resolve anew
were already resolved against Appellants by the trial court.
A party failing to prevail in the lower court may not recite
evidence favorable to its contentions to the exclusion of
evidence supporting the lower court's findings.
Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).

Thomson v.

The question on

appeal is not what the trial court could have found but,
rather, were the findings supported by the evidence.
Appellantsf statement of the law in the Conclusion of their
brief that this Court may substitute its own findings where
the evidence would support different findings is erroneous.
Rule 7(a) and Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cited
11

by Appellants are not authority for such assertion.

The

evidence is clearly sufficient to support the trial court's
findings.

Indeed, Respondents urge that the evidence should

satisfy this Court as it did the trial court.

Therefore, the

judgment should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND
VALID CONSIDERATION.
Three different agreements were drafted at the request
of Gassers.

Exhibits 4-P, 5-P (22-D) and 6-P.

Only Exhibit

6-P was finally executed on June 29, 1973, by both Appellants
and Respondents.

This final agreement provided that in

consideration for extending their credit by cosigning the note
and trust deed to American Savings, Respondents would receive
from Appellants a 50% interest in the trailer park; except
that in the event the note was resold within 30 days to
Equitable Savings, Respondents would receive nothing.

The

note and trust deed (Exh. 7-P) were executed by the Homes on
June 28 and irrevocably placed in the hands of the escrow
holder on June 29.

The note and trust deed were not sold

within the 30-day period.

The only reason that the note and

trust deed bearing signatures of the Homes were not recorded
on July 30 is because this suit was brought by Appellants and
an injunction was issued preventing such recordation.
Appellants do not cite any cases holding that Respondents'
extension of credit and assumption of liability do not
12

constitute sufficient consideration to support the agreement.
Those cases cited by Appellants merely state the general rule—
that consideration requires either a detriment to the promisee
or a benefit to the promisor at his request.

In Manwill v.

Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961), this Court expounded
this general rule that " . . . the principal must be bound to
give some legal consideration to the other by conferring a
benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his
request. . . ."

There is little question but that both exist

in this case; On June 29, Respondents agreed to become and
actually became personally liable for $1,050,000.00—a detriment to the promisees; Appellants received a loan which they
could not have done without Homes signing with them on one
set of the loan documents.

They (Gassers) increased their

ownership in the trailer park from 42.5% to 50% and received
$94,000.00 in cash for their own personal use—benefits to
the promisors as per their request.
Several courts have found sufficient consideration to
enforce a contract in similar situations.

Western Savings &

Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National Homes Corp., 167 Colo. 93,
445 P.2d 892 (1968); Teague v. Edwards, 159 Tx. 94, 315
S.W.2d 950 (1958); Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Association
of Delaware, 34 DCh 172, 101 A.2d 308 (1953); Bryant v.
Starkey, 8 Div. 439, 39 So.2d 291 (1949); Casserleigh v.
Wood, 119 Fed. 308 (8th Cir., 1902).
In Casserleigh v. Wood, supra, the appellant contracted
13

to give an estate in real property in return for factual
evidence to establish a legal claim.

This evidence was later

determined to be immaterial to appellant's claim.

In an

effort to avoid the contract the appellant claimed that the
same was unsupported by consideration.

In rejecting this

claim the court stated the general rule that "if the evidence
was supposed material and necessary to establish the claim
at the time of the promise, then the contract was founded on
valuable consideration."

(Emphasis added)

If the promise

was given for that which the promisor supposed he needed, the
contract does not become voidable because of subsequent
discovery that it is immaterial.

Consideration is determined

by conditions as they exist when the agreement is made and
not by subsequent developments.

Western Federal Savings &

Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National Homes Corp., supra; Raine v.
Spreckels, 77 Cal.App.2d 117, 174 P.2d 857 (1941); Teague v.
Edwards, supra.
This is also the law in Utah.

In Allen v. Rose Park

Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951), this Court stated
that "mutual promises that will be or apparently may be
detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee and
neither of which are void" constitute sufficient consideration.
(Emphasis added)
A defense of unjust enrichment was rejected by the Colorado
court when a construction lender sought to enforce certain
lien waivers executed by the defendant construction supplier
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in Western Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of Denver v. National
Homes Corp., supra.

The court reversed the trial court's

decision that the lien waivers were unsupported by consideration which resulted in unjust enrichment to the bank, stating:
" . . . These items of consideration were not equal to
the performance of National and it may be that National
will receive nothing for its 12 packages. Nevertheless,
legally there was consideration. A benefit to the
promisor or a detriment to the promisee can constitute
consideration, however slight . . . [and] is not to be
measured in light of the eventual success or failure
under a contract but rather consideration is measured
as of the time of making the contract. . . . "
"Since there is consideration, the doctrine of unjust
enrichment cannot be used as a basis to nullify the
[lien] waivers."
There^ the consideration to support the lien waivers was
a promise by the lender to extend credit to the contractor.
It is also interesting to note that in the cases cited
by Appellants, the courts found sufficient consideration
supporting Respondents1 position.

See Malcoff v. Coyier, 14

Ariz. App. 524, 484 P.2d 1053 (1971); Teromen v. Kent-Brown
Chevrolet Company, 217 Kan. 223, 535 P.2d 873 (1975); Kadish
v. Kallof, 3 Ariz. App. 344, 414 P.2d 193 (1966); and Blonder
v. Gentile, 149 Cal.App.2d 24, 309 P.2d 147 (1957).

In Temmen,

the Kansas court found sufficient consideration where the
plaintiff suffered only the detriment of giving up the right
to receive elsewhere a better bargain for auto repair work.
The facts of the instant case clearly show that
Respondents suffered a detriment, not slight but major; in
fact, a personal liability for $1,050,000.00.
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Likewise,

Appellants gained several benefits.

Even American Savings

incurred a benefit as a result of Respondents1 promises and,
of course, consideration may move to or from a third party.
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §94.
Notwithstanding the fact that Homes executed a note for
$1,050,000.00, Appellants claim lack of consideration in that
(1) the parties never intended that Homes become liable; (2)
agreement 6-P is fatally ambiguous; and (3) Homes never
actually became liable to American Savings.

These contentions

are clearly contrary to the evidence and the findings of the
trial court.
A.

(R. 228; Findings 4-5)

The parties expected and intended that Respondents

would be personally liable on the note and mortgage.
It is certainly a novel approach to say that experienced,
sophisticated businessmen would arrange for and execute a one
million dollar promissory note, never intending or expecting
to be liable for the same.

The testimony is clear that all

the parties both intended and expected Homes to be personally
liable.

(Tr. 60, 63, 117, 248-250, 356-357, 371)

Indeed, it

is ridiculous to even suppose that in making such an unusually
large loan American Savings would require Homes to cosign
the note but never expect them to be liable.

It was clearly

understood that without the additional strength of Homes 1
credit, American Savings would not make the loan.

(Exh. 11-P)

The undisputed fact is that American Savings & Loan would not
have approved the loan nor authorized the disbursal of the
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funds thereafter if Homes had not signed the note and trust
deed.

(Tr. 119, 228-230, 248-250; Exhs. 7-P and 11-P)

The initial loan commitment from American Savings was
addressed to both H o m e and Gasser.

(Tr. 57; Exh. 3-P)

Gasser testified that he knew American Savings considered
H o m e liable and, in fact, as early as March, 1973, discussed
Home's liability with American Savings.

(Tr. 62-64)

In

discussing with H o m e his participation in the loan, he
further testified that H o m e stated " . . . that if he [Home]
was going to enter into liabilities that he should receive
compensation to compensate for this liability."

(Tr. 60)

At

the time document 4-P was drafted, Gasser understood that in
return for a one-half interest H o m e would be committed to the
entire amount of the loan.

(Tr. 116-117)

Gasser spent April, May and June attempting to remove
Homes 1 liability but was unsuccessful.

The American Savings

commitment letter of June 6 stated that either the loan would
have to be presold before closing or that Homes would have
to sign.

(Tr. 118-119, 248-249; Exh. 11-P)

Certainly

Appellants read and understood the various escrow documents
and their deed to H o m e and must be presumed to have intended
the natural result and consequence by signing them.

(Exhs. 7,

8, 9)
H o m e testified that his purpose in signing the note and
deed (Exh. 7-P) was to guarantee the loan with American
Savings:
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Q. (By Mr, Nielsen) Now, what was the purpose of your
signing the trust deed and note which appears a part of
Exhibit 7-P?
"A. To guarantee a loan with American Savings.
354)

(Tr.

"Q. Are you prepared at this time to remain liable on
those documents in reference to this transaction?
"A.

Yes."

(Tr. 356)

In an effort to support their claim regarding lack of
consideration, Appellants point to the change of the word
"removing" to "eliminating" on the face of Exhibit 4-P,
paragraph 3.

Such a specious attempt to distinguish the

meaning of these terms is itself meaningless.

It is merely

an attempt to misconstrue the clear meaning of a document
which is itself the best evidence of the intent of the parties
and which this Court is able to read and evaluate as the trial
court did.

Both Websters International Dictionary and the

Oxford English Dictionary define "eliminate" as "to remove"
and "remove" as "to eliminate."

Such attempted implications

as alleged are at best tenuous.

There is even a dispute as

to when and how the change ever occurred.

(Tr. 118)

As further indication of the weakness of Appellants'
position, there is no testimony that Appellants' attorney
requested the change in Exhibit 5-P, paragraph 3.
224, 307; Exhs. 5-P and 6-P)

(Tr. 145,

Appellants have miscited the

record in an attempt to bolster their claims.

Even so,

Appellants' naked assertion that the changes made in paragraphs
3 and 4 indicate that the parties did not intend liability
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is entirely unsupported.

If anything, these paragraphs make

it crystal clear that the parties intended Homes should
receive an interest if the 30-day condition was not met.
This Court has held that where the parties to a transaction dispute the intent surrounding some act involved in the
transaction, the question of the intent is a factual issue
and the determination of that factual issue will not be
disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it.
Taylor v. Turner, 27 U.2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Youngren
v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 U.2d 207, 450 P.2d
985 (1969).
B.

Agreement 6-P states a valuable and sufficient

consideration.
Appellants claim that by the language of agreement 6-P
Respondents did not agree to do anything.
not correct.

This assertion is

When Exhibit 6-P was signed, Respondents had

already performed.

The note and trust deed were signed by

Respondents on Thursday, June 28.

(Tr. 304)

These were

delivered to the escrow holder on June 29 and became
irrevocable when Appellants executed the escrow documents.
(Tr. 308)

Agreement 6-P was executed by Gassers on Friday,

the 29th, with the other escrow documents, Exhibits 7, 8 and
9.
Agreement 6-P states the valuable consideration of both
parties.

The trial court properly found sufficient considera-

tion both in the* instrument and implied in the surrounding
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circumstances.

California Wine Assoc, v. Wisconsin Liquor

Co., 20 Wise.2d 110, 121 N.W.2d 308 (1963); Vars v. Fisher,
405 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App., 1966)
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §90, states:
"It is the general rule that a consideration for a
contract need not be recited or expressed in the writing
since, if not expressed, consideration may be implied by
or inferred from the terms and obvious import of the
contract, or it may be proved by parole evidence."
(Emphasis added)
In In Re Las Colinas Inc., 294 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R.,
196 8), an action by a debtor to rescind several notes and
recover security given, the federal court stated the law to
be:
"Even though consideration is not expressed in a contract,
it is presumed that it exists and that it is licit
unless the debtor proves the contrary." (294 F.S. at
p.597)
The Tenth Circuit has also held that:
". ... A contract includes all implied promises as are
indispensable to effectuate the intent of the parties."
New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 108 F.2d
65 (10th Cir., 1939).
Williston states that a promise which originally might
have been too indefinite may become definite by performance.
If a promise itself is insufficient but performance gives
benefit or detriment, the promise becomes binding.

Jaeger,

Williston on Contracts, 3d ed., §106.
Cases cited by Appellants do not support their position.
In Malcoff v. Coyier, supra, the defendant orally agreed to
pay plaintiff a commission for the sale of defendant's land.
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Defendant later attempted to avoid the agreement by claiming
lack of consideration.

The court stated that:

"We agree that it is essential that . . . there be a
consideration or a mutuality of obligation; that its
terms be sufficiently clear so that one can state with
certainty the obligation involved. If the terms are
ambiguous or uncertain, there is no contract unless by
the performance of the parties it is shown and indicated
that there was . . . a mutual understanding of agreement."
(484 P.2d at p.1055)
The court then outlined the performing acts of the plaintiff
and enforced the contract.
In the instant case the terms of the written contract
are sufficiently clear and can be stated with certainty; that
the parties had negotiated a loan with American Savings; that
Respondents would provide the necessary financial backing for
that loan and that Appellants would give a 50% interest in
the property if Respondents were not removed from liability
within 30 days.

Furthermore, a "mutual understanding of

agreement" was obviously reached when, in performance,
Respondents executed the note and trust deed and Appellants
executed the escrow documents.
Also, in accord are the following cases cited by Appellants:
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Company, supra; and Blonder v.
Gentile, supra.
C.

Respondents became and continue to be actually and

personally liable to American Savings for $1,050,000.00.
At the closing of the loan and for 30 days thereafter,
the note and trust deed executed by Homes were held in escrow.
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As previously noted, if at the end of 30 days (July 30, 1973)
the loan remained unpurchased by Equitable Savings, then these
documents would be immediately recorded and delivered to
American Savings.

(Tr. 249-250, 214-216; Exh. 7-P)

By the

terms of said note and trust deed, Respondents were personally
liable.

On July 3, 1973, Equitable Savings gave notice that

it would not purchase the loan.

(Tr. 250)

During July, Gasser

made no attempts to ask for an extension from H o m e or to
obtain further help from American Savings.

On July 30, 1973,

the note and trust deed, not having been resold, were to be
delivered to American Savings. Mr. Marsh, the escrow agent,
testified that he was prepared to so proceed but was prevented
from doing so by the filing of this lawsuit.

(Tr. 214-216)

But for the acts of Appellants, Respondentsf note would have
been delivered to American Savings.

However, the trial gave

effect to the transaction as if the note had been delivered.
Appellants claim that American Savings never considered
Homes liable; and, therefore, to enforce the agreement will
result in a "windfall" to Homes.

Gasser1 s testimony and the

testimony of Mr. Bradshaw undeniably indicate that American
Savings would not have made the loan without Respondents being
liable.

(Tr. 116-117, 248-249)

At trial, American Savings

requested that Respondents be held liable with Appellants.
(Tr. 372)

By judgment of the trial court, Respondents are

and continue to be liable to American Savings:
"2.

Defendants H o m e are jointly and severally liable
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with Plaintiffs on that certain Promissory Note dated
June 25, 1973, in the principal sum of $1,050,000.00
payable to American Savings and Loan Association."
(R. 236)
Respondents have never repudiated or sought to avoid
personal liability for the one million dollars plus.
Appellants also argue that since Respondents have not
made any personal payments, they have, in fact, not suffered
any detriment.

This is irrelevant since the note payments

are being made from income produced by the trailer park in
which Respondents own a 50% undivided interest.

It might just

as well be said that Appellants have not made any payments on
the note either.

It is relevant, however, to emphasize that

under the terms of the loan transaction, Respondents are
legally obligated personally to make payments on the indebtedness if for any reason payments are not otherwise made.
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Company, supra, cites
Williston on Contracts, saying that detriment means "legal
detriment as distinguished from detriment in fact."

Williston

defines "legal detriment" as:
". . . A detriment to the promisee, in a legal sense,
if he, at the request of the promisor and upon the
strength of that promise, had performed any act which
occasioned him the slightest trouble or inconvenience
and which he was not obliged to perform." Jaeger,
Williston on Contracts, 3d. ed., §102A.
And in response to Appellants1 charge of "unjust enrichment," Am. Jur. 2d provides:
"Where on the part of the promisee, who was under no
duty to do so, there has been an act . . . at the request
of the promisor and upon the strength of that promise,
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which act . . . occasioned the promisee disadvantage . . .
though slight and not actually harmful, there is valid
consideration, . . . "
"If the promisee does something that he is not legally
bound to do, the fact that he himself derives a benefit
therefrom is not material." (Emphasis added) 17 Am. Jur.
2d Contracts, §97.
Agreement 6-P is binding and enforceable by the parties,
being supported by valid and sufficient consideration.

The

consideration by Homes was given and performance completed.
Respondents are willing and able to remain liable on the
promissory note and trust deed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FIND ECONOMIC
DURESS OR COERCION.
Appellants claim agreement 6-P is void, having been
executed by them as a result of the duress and coercion of
Homes and Mr. Henriod.

The findings of the lower court are

that:
"12. The attorney representing the creditors of
Plaintiffs . . . also represented Defendant H o m e on
other matters but did not represent him in connection
with the negotiations with Plaintiffs.
"13. Plaintiffs were at all times during their negotiations with Defendants H o m e represented by legal counsel
and Plaintiffs counseled with their attorney. . . .
"14. Plaintiffs executed said agreement . . . voluntarily
and were not induced, coerced, intimidated or otherwise
compelled to enter into such agreement by any improper
conduct on the part of Defendants H o m e .
"15. Defendants at no time were guilty of any wrongful
or improper conduct. . . . "
(R. 229-230, Findings of
Fact 12-15)
Appellants1 brief is replete with insinuations and
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accusations of impropriety.

We believe that to take up each

item and refute it would be a waste of the Court's time.
Respondents prefer merely to discuss the relevant issues. As
before stated, Appellants ask this Court to substitute their
"proposed" findings for the trial court's findings.

The issue

is not how this Court might find the facts based upon
Appellants' choice of testimony, but whether the findings of
the lower court are supported by the evidence.

Pagano v.

Walker, supra; Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra; Thomson v. Condas,
supra.

The evidence, as well as Respondents' authorities

cited herein, amply support the above findings that Gassers
were not wrongfully threatened or coerced into their agreement
with Homes.
Mr. Henriod, representing Dr. Skankey and "the group,"
sought to require Gassers to pay their delinquent obligations.
(Tr. 113, 330)

Gasser personally contacted Mr. Henriod and

asked for his assistance in acquiring Dr. Skankey's interest
in the property.

(Tr. 113-114, 318; Exh. 15-D)

It was Gasser

who called Mr. Henriod for an appointment on March 29, 1973,
and told Henriod that he had arranged financing through Homes.
(Tr. 290)

When Gasser brought H o m e into Mr. Henriod's office,

Mr. Henriod did not participate in the negotiations but left
them to work out their own arrangement.

(Tr. 115, 291)

Home

never asked Mr. Henriod for his counsel or advice, and Mr.
Henriod never offered it.

(Tr. 113-115, 290, 301-302, 335,

36 8) At all times Mr. Henriod acted as attorney for the
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mortgagees and aided Gasser, only at the latter's request, in
order to facilitate the eventual satisfaction of the debts
owing to Henriod's clients.

It was Gasser who dictated to

Mr. Henriod the terms of agreement 4-P (Tr. 291); Gasser,
after personally resolving his differences with H o m e on June
27 and 28, called Mr. Henriod, instructing him how to rewrite
document 5-P (Tr. 302); Exhibit 6-P was also a result of
Gasser's initiative.

(Tr. 145, 306, 326)

During the entire

transaction from April to July of 1973, H o m e never consulted
nor requested advice from Mr. Henriod, never offered or agreed
to pay for any legal services and never asked Henriod to
prepare documents or otherwise represent him in any manner.
(Tr. 365, 367-369)

Mr. Henriod never suggested that Homes

should receive compensation from Gasser for their liability
on the obligation or even that they should lend their credit.
In fact, it appears that H o m e had assisted Gasser on a
financial matter or matters on a prior occasion.

(Tr. 34-36)

In order to perceive the weakness of Appellantsf argument
of coercion from Homes and Mr. Henriod, this Court need only
examine the quality of that argument.

As an example of their

alleged "squeeze play," Appellants point to a letter from Mr.
Henriod to Mr. Barker, which letter was marked for identification as 17-D.

They single out an apparent typographical error

as evidence that Mr. Henriod in fact represented Homes.
However, that document was not even offered or received in
evidence because of the objection to its introduction by
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Appellants1 counsel.

(Tr. 122, 153, R. 225; Exh. 17-D)

It is undisputed that Mr. Henriod exerted considerable
pressure on Appellants to pay their obligations.

In June,

1973, Gassers were over six months in default on their
obligations of over $350,000.00.

Mr. Henriod was retained to

collect that amount and to foreclose the mortgages if necessary.
Appellants claim that Mr. Henriod "threatened" American Savings
& Loan.

However, in the testimony recited by Appellants, Mr.

Howard Bradshaw, President of American Savings, specifically
stated that he was never "threatened."

He testified only

that the situation became too "uncomfortable" and "messy."
(Tr. 241-242)

Mr. Henriod testified that he did not discuss

any problems between Gassers and Homes and that in conversations with American Savings only inquired when the loan
proceeds would be available to Dr. Skankey and "the group."
(Tr. 333-335)
It is a general rule that to threaten to do that which
a party has a legal right to do does not constitute duress or
coercion.
(1967).

Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949

Enforcement of a legal right by threats of fore-

closure is not duress.

Kopp v. Fink, 204 Okla. 570, 232 P.2d

161 (1951); Browning v. Blair, 169 Kan. 139, 218 P.2d 233
(1950); Stafford v. Field, 70 Ida. 331, 218 P.2d 338 (1950);
25 Am. Jur. 2d, Duress and Undue Influence, §7; Jaeger,
Williston on Contracts (3d ed.), §§1606, 1608, 1618A.

To

ascribe to Mr. Henriod the attributes of a "card shark"
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because he "held all the aces" is to suggest that every
mortgagee with a right to foreclose a delinquent mortgage is
a "river boat gambler."

It was Mr. Henriod's right and duty

to force satisfaction of the indebtedness to his clients by
foreclosure if necessary.

If any criticism is due, it is in

his cooperation with the Gassers to give them additional time
to arrange their refinancing.
In Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, 274 S.W.2d 502
(Mo. App., 1955), the plaintiffs attempted to rescind an
agreement to pay a certain sum for the care of their aged
mother, alleging that the defendant knew and took advantage
of her economic and physiological straits.

Plaintiffs

testified they signed the agreement unwillingly because there
was nothing else to do.

In rejecting their claims, the

Missouri court stated:
" . . . Duress cannot be sustained where there is full
knowledge of the facts of the situation and ample time
and opportunity for full and free investigation,
deliberation and reflection. [citations omitted]."
Gassers had every opportunity from April to June of 1973
to make other financing arrangements without Homes.

They

were unsuccessful in dealing individually with American Savings;
but the record does not show what other, if any, efforts were
actually taken by them.

Yet, as late as June 25, 1973, Gasser

told Mr. Henriod that the loan would be closed without Homes'
assistance.

(Tr. 298-299)

Mr. Henriod, representing Dr.

Skankey and "the group," acted in reliance thereon.
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Gasser

corroborates this testimony.

(Tr. 135-137; Exh. 18-D)

Even

during the crucial period of June 25 to June 29, Gassers had
ample opportunity to consult and did consult with their
counsel.

They might have taken some alternative action.

In

fact, Mr. Henriodfs testimony indicates he fully expected
such might be the case:
11

Q. And so at that time you knew that unless Mr. H o m e
put his agreement, signature to that agreement that he
was insisting on at that time that the money would go
back again to American Savings and Loan and Mr. Gasser
would lose everything he had, you knew that at that time,
did you not?
"A. You have asked me at least two questions.
Responding to the first one, did I know that the money
was there? The answer is yes, yes.
"Did I know where the money would go if it didn't
finalize? I didn't know where it would go. He might
have had another deal, he is always saying he had
alternative routes, he may have gone another way.
"Third, I never made the statment that he would lose
everything he had.
"Q.

Well, you were threatening to foreclose.

"A. Yes, I was threatening to foreclose but that was
only part of his assets." (Tr. 336-337)
When asked about the alleged "threat" by Mr. Henriod in
Home's office, H o m e testified as follows:
"Q. Did you at any time on that date [June 28] hear Mr.
Henroid [Henriod] state in substance and effect to Mr.
and Mrs. Gasser unless they sign Exhibit 5-P that they
would lose everything they had?
. . . [Objection of counsel overruled]
"The witness: No, I did not."

(Tr. 355)

As authorities for their argument, Appellants cite
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Dittbrenner v. Myerson, 114 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946);
and Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524
P.2d 1021 (1974).
findings.

These cases support the trial court's

In Dittbrenner, the court found the plaintiff was

coerced when she was forced to sign a conveyance and agreement.
Yet the court did so after testimony that the plaintiff was
in fear of "injury to her person" and the destruction of her
property.

Also, the court found constructive fraud in the

inducements made to the plaintiff.

In the instant case,

there is no evidence that Gassers were ever in fear of
physical injury to themselves or destruction of their property.
(Tr. 187)

The Colorado court also characterized the plaintiff.

as a weak woman with a lack of business judgment.

This case

has since been cited as applicable to weak and incompetent
persons.

Certainly Appellants cannot be so characterized.

Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., supra, merely
supports Respondents' argument that the trial court's findings
are affinned when supported by the evidence.

In Terrel, the

New Mexico court, affirming the findings of economic duress
by the trial court, stated:
"The charge of economic compulsion, like fraud, is one
easily made. . . .
It must therefore be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. . . .
.

. •

"'It is a well settled rule that this court, on appeal,
will . . . view the evidence in an aspect most favorable
to the judgment and the party prevailing below. . . .
[T]he weight of the evidence is not considered on appeal,
rather only, if there is any substantial evidence to
support the verdict. . . .'
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. . . [citations omitted]
"The above cases conform with the ordinary rules of
review of the record on appeal. That is, presumptions
are in favor of verdicts and reviewing courts will view
the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, will indulge in all reasonable inferences in
support of the verdict, and will disregard all inferences
or evidence to the contrary. Further, it is for the
jury and not the reviewing court to weigh the testimony,
determine the credibility of witnesses, reconcile
inconsistent or contradictory statements of witnesses
and say where the truth lies. . . . [citations omitted]
We will review the evidence to determine if it is
sufficient to establish, clearly and convincingly, the
claim of economic compulsion."
Upon examination of the trial court's findings in Terrel,
the appellate court detailed numerous incidents over several
years which established a pattern of consistent conduct by
the defendant to ruin the plaintiff financially so as to
acquire his lumber business.

The defendant creditor continually

"meddled" in the plaintiff's business until the plaintiff was
deprived of all economic decisions.
Appellants Gasser did not meet their burden of proof in
the trial below.
their claims.

The evidence clearly preponderates against

Even under the "Terrel test" which Appellants

ask this Court to apply, Respondents did not act in a
"commercially unreasonable manner" by asking for a 50% interest
in exchange for a 100% liability.

Neither was Mr. Henriod

unreasonable in pressuring for the payment to his clients of
$350,000.00 in already delinquent notes.
This Court is well aware of its prior decisions regarding
duress and coercion.

Reliable Furniture Co. v. American Home
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Assurance Co., 24 U.2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970); Reliable
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters
Inc., 16 U.2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965); Fox v. Piercey, 119
Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951); and Ellison v. Pingree, 64
Utah 468, 231 Pac. 827 (1924).
In Fox, this Court applied the modern subjective standard
which asks the question:
"Did the threats or coercive acts put one entering into
the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise
by him of free will and judgment? Age, sex, capacity,
relation of the parties, attendant circumstances must
all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature
are the very ones that need protection. The courageous
can usually take care of themselves." 227 P.2d at 766.
Appellants' argument confuses the old objective standard with
the modern subjective standard articulated by this Court.
Probing a person's actual state of mind is purely subjective
and at best can only be analyzed by reference to objective and
visible signs such as are noted above.

Chief Justice Wolfe,

concurring, alerted the Court to the inevitable dangers of a
subjective approach:
"I see merit in the so-called modern rule that any threat
which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel
him to act against his will constitutes duress but it has
reaches which ramify into the realm of psychology and, in
its practical application, may encounter difficulties of
discernment between the sly and the timid. The brash and
robust mind may easily later on take a sensitive hue.
'The devil a monk would be' if it might aid recovery."
227 P.2d at 768.
This is precisely the approach now taken by Appellants.
In order to resolve financial problems of their own making,
Gassers arranged their agreement with Homes so that Gassers
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could purchase the entire mobile park and take home $94,000.00
in cash.

Gassers, now pointing to their new sensitive natures,

claim rescission when the transaction did not work out as
anticipated by them.
However, the Court in Fox, realizing this danger of the
modern, subjective form of analysis which they adopted,
provided a caveat:
"We approve this modern rule. It is obvious that
applying this subjective test might theoretically
degenerate to a point where a person desiring to avoid
a contract might claim that practically any conduct of
another put him in fear and overcame his will. It is
necessary that there be some objective standard for
determining when duress has been practiced. It must
appear that the threat or act is of such a nature and
made under such circumstances as to constitute a reasonable and adequate cause to control the will of the
threatened person, Ellison v. Pingree, supra. 17 Am.
Jur. 8857 note 15 and authorities there cited.
"Notwithstanding the fact that we approve this modern
and liberal rule as a test of whether or not duress has
been practiced, under all the authorities, ancient and
modern, the act or threat constituting duress must be
wrongful." [Emphasis added] 227 P.2d at 766.
In essence, this Court designed a three-prong test: the acts
complained of must constitute reasonable and adequate cause
to control the will of the complainant; the acts must actually
put the complaining victim in such fear as to compel actions
against his will; and the acts must be wrongful.
In Ellison v. Pingree, supra, this Court was asked to
review facts similar to the instant case.

Pingree1s company,

the Ogden Packing and Provisions Company, incurred heavy
financial losses and was unable to pay Chicago creditors.
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Security was demanded by these creditors and they threatened
Pingree with civil and criminal actions for fraud and actions
against the company for its indebtedness.

In March, after a

week of negotiations, Pingree agreed to deliver personally
secured notes for the indebtedness.

However, a few months

later Pingree suggested modifications of the agreement which
were opposed by the creditors.
were reiterated.

Threats of criminal prosecution

In June, Pingree signed an agreement to

secure obligations of $250,000.00. At all times Pingree was
represented by and consulted with his attorney.

His counsel

advised him not to sign the agreement; but when told by Pingree
that he must, the attorney tried to get for him the best deal
possible by suggesting modifications in the terms of the
contracts.

Later, Pingree sued to rescind the agreement,

claiming that the same was without consideration and was obtained
by duress.
The court analyzed the age, financial condition of the
plaintiff, the relative positions of the parties and other
surrounding circumstances of the transaction.

Since the

plaintiff was a wealthy businessman of varied experience and
during all the negotiations had the benefit of legal counsel,
the court indicated there was no duress involved.

Furthermore,

the court stated that Pingree, in a large measure, had
dictated the terms of the agreements and was largely benefited
by being released from a prior contract.
the court stated:
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Regarding duress,

"•. . . duress will not ordinarily invalidate a contract
entered into after opportunity for deliberate action.
Duress by mere advice, direction, influence, and persuasion is not recognized in law. Nor can a charge of legal
duress be based on mere vexation and annoyance, mere
pecuniary distress, a threat to injure one's credit, or
the refusal to surrender property on which one has a
lien.'

111

A person in his right mind and in full control of his
faculties, who understands what he is doing and who has
full power to enter into a legal transaction or to refuse
to do so, does not act under duress if he enters into
such transaction.1" 64 Utah at 476-477.
There is no duress when Appellants are free to come and
go and to consult with counsel.

Ellison v. Pingree, supra;

Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885 (3d
Cir., 1975); Palatucci v. Woodland, 166 Pa. Super. 315, 70
A.2d 674 (1950), and cases cited therein.
Again, in Ellison, the court commented on the allegation
of lack of consideration in urging the claim of duress:
"It would be a needless task to undertake to point out
why the contention is untenable. The mere fact that Mr.
Pingree not only had a pecuniary interest, but a very
large pecuniary interest in maintaining the credit and
integrity of the company, was one sufficient consideration for the contracts." 64 Utah at 478.
In Reliable Furniture v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance
Underwriters, Inc., supra, this Court, applying the law of
Fox and Ellison, reversed the trial court's summary judgment
and remanded the case for a decision on the evidence.

This

Court stated the general rule that the fact one is in financial
need inducing him to accept a settlement will not, of itself,
provide a basis for relief.

398 P.2d at 687.
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However, as

quoted by Appellants, since the plaintiff also claimed fraud
by the insurance company, the court could not find, as a
matter of law, that there was no duress.

At trial, the lower

court dismissed plaintiff's case after hearing the evidence.
This Court affirmed, stating that there was insufficient
evidence of fraud or duress.
Home Assurance Co., supra.

Reliable Furniture v. American

The plaintiff could not claim

fraud and duress after he had cashed the insurance checks and
accepted the benefits of the agreement.
same situation in the instant case.

There exists the

Not only did Gassers

accept the benefit of the agreement, but they also ended up
with a cash payment to them of $94,000.00 from the proceeds
of the loan.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS A JURY
TRIAL.
Appellants1 argument that they were entitled to a jury
trial is equally without merit.

For purposes of seeking this

Court's review of the trial court's findings, Appellants
suggest this case is an action in equity.

But when they come

to discuss the alleged deprivation of their "rights" to a
jury trial, Appellants would have us treat this case as an
action at law.
The case was originally set for non-jury trial on October
11, 1974. How the case was set on the jury calendar
Respondents and the lower court were unable to determine.
36

Contrary to the suggestion of Appellants, both parties did not
"expect a jury trial."

Certainly Respondents entertained no

such expectation and when it was learned that Appellants had
apparently requested a jury (without any notice to Respondents)
moved to strike the case from the jury calendar.
Respondents' motion to strike was granted.

(R. 214-215)

(R. 218, 220)

(1) Appellants1 brief states the nature of the
case to be an action to declare a contract and agreement null
and void; that the suit was brought to rescind that agreement
and to cancel a deed in escrow.

(R. 1-2)

An action to cancel

an instrument or rescind a contract for fraud or duress is an
equitable action and does not entitle a party to trial by
jury.

Johnson v. Johnson, 9 U.2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959);

Summers v. Martin, 77 Ida. 469, 295 P.2d 265 (1956); Goodson
v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163 (1952), reh. den. 244 P.2d
805; Liles v. Bigpond, 190 Okla. 112, 121 P.2d 596 (1942), and
numerous authorities cited by these courts.

In Goodson, a

deed was already placed in escrow and the defendants counterclaimed for specific performance.

In Bigpond, the Oklahoma

court interpreted a statute very similar to §78-21-1, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), and held it inapplicable to an action
for rescission or cancellation of an agreement to convey.
This is not an action to recover the possession of real
property within the purview of §78-21-1, U.C.A. (1953).

The

decisions of this Court are certainly dispositive of the issue.
In Johnson, this Court held that a suit to declare certain
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instruments void for reason of duress or undue influence was
properly characterized by the trial court as an action in
equity and, therefore, no jury trial. A review of Appellants1
complaint shows that the issues raised are wholly and purely
equitable in nature.

And, only recently, this Court stated

that when the principal thrust of a case is equitable, to-wit:
specific performance (Respondents1 requested relief), the
lower court properly denied a trial by jury.

Bradshaw v.

Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1974).
At the time of trial Appellants did not make any demand
to the court that the case be tried to a jury.

Rather,

Appellants• counsel sought to characterize the action as one
for injunctive relief (R. 1-2); "to retain the status quo"
(T. 97)—further indication that the issues presented are
equitable.

See^ also, Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U.2d

113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966).
(2) Appellants failed to make proper demand for a
jury trial under the requirements of Rule 38 (b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the then local rule, Rule 15, Rules
of Practice in the Third Judicial District Court,

Both rules

require written demand and Rule 38(b) requires that the
written demand be served on the opposing party.

As admitted

by Appellants, the record reveals that no written demand was
filed nor ever served on Respondents.

Yet the failing party

begs excuse, crying that since Respondents later learned of
a "jury demand," no harm was done.
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After all, Appellants

claim, following the requirements of the rules is not
important.

This Court has previously been acquainted with the

failure of these Appellants to follow the requirements of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and then later beg this Court1s
indulgence.

Rule 38(b) states that demand must be served on

Respondents in writing.

Substantial performance cannot be

accomplished by merely paying the requisite jury fee and
hoping the opposing party learns about it sometime in the
future.
The trial court has discretion to permit or deny trial
by jury, particularly when demand was improper.

The denial

of a jury trial when demand is improper is not an abuse of
discretion.

Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., supra; James

Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 15 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964),
and cases cited therein.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion when, after hearing arguments of counsel and
considering the authoritative cases from this Court, it
granted Respondents1 motion to strike from the jury calendar.
(R. 218)
In asking this Court to remand this case for a jury trial,
Appellants are raising an issue not raised at trial or after
trial.

The Supreme Court cannot look dehors the record on

appeal and consider facts which are stated in a brief but are
absent from the record.

Cooper v. Foersters Underwriters Inc.,

123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953).

It is the responsibility

of Appellants to see that all matters essential to a decision
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of a question be properly included in the record on appeal.
All the record in this matter shows is the absence of a proper
demand for jury trial and Respondents1 motion and the court's
order striking the matter from the jury calendar.

Appellants

were therefore not entitled to a jury trial and may not raise
this issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The findings and judgment of the lower court are
substantially supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
Respondents have been and continue to be liable to American
Savings & Loan and are entitled to an undivided 50% interest
in the Hill Gate Mobile Home Park.

Appellants voluntarily

entered into a valid agreement with Respondents, supported by
sufficient and valuable consideration, and were not induced
by duress, coercion or any other improper or wrongful conduct.
The trial court properly denied Appellants a jury trial
since Appellants were not entitled thereto and totally failed
to comply with the provisions of Rule 38(b) in attempting to
secure one.
Respondents H o m e respectfully submit that the judgment
and decree of the trial court be affirmed.

v
Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
NIELSEN, HENRIOD,.GOTTFREDSON &
PECK
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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